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American Stock Exchange and National Association
of Securities Dealers Investigations: Fifth
Amendment Implications
I.

INTRODUCTION

The securities markets, composed of the stock exchanges
and the over the counter (OTC) market, play an important
role in the United States economy.' Trading on the exchanges,
in establishing the price level of listed securities and affecting
securities prices generally, is seen as an indicator of our nation's economic health.'
This trading is directly regulated by the exchange organizations and, in the OTC market, by the National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASD).' These self-regulating organizations (SROs) are subject to the regulatory power vested in the
Securities and Exchange Commission (herinafter Commission
or SEC) by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (hereinafter
Exchange Act or ACT). 4 SROs must enforce among their
members the provisions of the Exchange Act, rules and regulations promulgated under the Act, and the SRO's internal
rules.5
To effect this legislative mandate the exchanges and the
NASD are delegated certain governmerital powers.6 Included
0 1981 by Sharon O'Grady
1. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963)
Stock Exchanges perform an important function in the economic life of this country.
They serve, first of all, as an indispensible mechanism through which corporate securities may be bought and sold. To corporate enterprise such a market mechapism is a
fundamental element in facilitating the successful marshalling of large aggregations of
funds that would otherwise be extremely difficult to access. To the public the exchanges are an investment channel which promises ready convertibility of stock holdings into cash. The importance of these functions in dollar terifs is vast.
Id. at 349-50.
E.g., S. REP. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprintedin [1975] U.S. CoDe CONG.
& AD. NEws 181, 181; Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
2. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 350 (1963).
3. Self-regulation is mandated by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§78f, 78o-3 (1976).
4. Id. §§ 78a-78k (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
5. Id. §§ 78f(b)(1), 78o-3(b)(2) (1976).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§78a-78k (1976 & Supp. 11 1978). See S. REP. No. 94-75, supra
note 1, at 201-03. "The self-regulatory organizations must exercise governmental-type
powers if they are to carry out their responsibilities under the Exchange Act." Id. at
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is the power to discipline members, and certain nonmembers
permitted access to SRO facilities, through disciplinary proceedings.7 These proceedings are governed by the rules and

constitution of the SRO, and by the Exchange Act.'
Because the exchanges and the NASD play a vital role in
the securities area, loss of SRO membership or privileges is
correspondingly serious.9 In recognition of this fact, the courts
and Congress have found that persons subject to SRO disciplinary action must be afforded basic constitutional rights. 10
The SROs, in response to judicial and legislative pressure,
24, [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 203. See also Todd & Co. v. SEC, 557 F.
2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1977) (delegation of legislative power to the NASD not
unconstitutional).
7. See S. REP. No. 94-75, supra note 1, at 202-03.
The self-regulatory organizations exercise government power, and they
do so in basically three ways which may adversely affect the interests of
particular persons: (1) by imposing a disciplinary sanction, broadly defined, on a member or person affiliated with a member, (2) by denying
membership to an applicant, and (3) by requiring members to cease doing business entirely or in a specified way with a particular member or
with respect to a particular security.
Id. Self-regulating organizations impose disciplinary sanctions through disciplinary
action and summary suspension. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78o-3 (1976). Summary suspension may be taken against a member, a person associated with a member, or a
person permitted access to SRO services. After summary suspension the suspended
party is entitled to a hearing. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(d)(3), 78o(h)(3) (1976). This discussion
applies equally to § 78f(d)(1) and § 78o-3(h)(1) proceedings and § 78f(d)(3) and §
78o(h)(3) hearings after summary suspension.
8. See note 7 supra.
9. See, e.g., Robert W. Stark, Jr., Inc. v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 346 F.
Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). "It is a matter of extreme obloquy for an individual person to be expelled as a NYSE member. Expulsion may affect adversely his standing
in the community and credit rating and reputation. He shows irreparable damage."
Id. at 232.
10. S. REP. No. 94-75, supra note 1, at 203-04. Silver v. New York Stock Exch.
373 U.S. 341 (1963); Todd & Co. v. SEC, 557 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1977); Intercontinental Indus. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842
(1971); Crimmins v. American Stock Exch., 368 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd,
503 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1974); Zuckerman v. Yount, 362 F. Supp. 858 (N.D. Ill. 1973);
Villani v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Crimmins
v. American Stock Exch., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see Don Anderson
& Co. v. SEC, 423 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1970); Cowen v. New York Stock Exch., 371
F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1967). SRO disciplinary proceedings may be attacked on three
grounds. The proceedings may violate the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1976).
The proceedings may constitute a refusal to deal in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Cf. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (NYSE termination of direct-wire telephone connections without notice and hearing violated Sherman Act). The proceedings may violate the due process rights of the targets under
the fifth amendment. Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d
935 (5th Cir. 1971). While these defenses are, to an extent, interrelated, this comment
addresses only the fifth amendment issue.
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have extended greater constitutional protections to the targets
of their investigation than had formerly existed.' 1 Not all of
their present practices, however, are protective of individual
rights. The three major self-regulatory organizations are the
New York and American Stock Exchanges (NYSE and
AMEX) and the NASD. The internal rules of two of these,
the AMEX and the NASD, provide that a member or affiliate
who refuses to testify or furnish information to the SRO may
be suspended or expelled from membership or, in the case of
an affiliate, lose that status.1"
11. For example, the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), the NASD and the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) have all abolished rules prohibiting subjects of
disciplinary proceedings to be represented by counsel at the disciplinary hearings.
AM. STOCK Ex. CONST. art. V, § 1(a), [1978] 2 AM. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) 2153; NEW
YORK STOCK EXCH. CONST. art. XIV, § 23, [1978] 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 1103, NASD
BY-LAws art. VII, § 4, [1973] NASD MANUAL (CCH) V 1504. See Poser, Reply to
Lowenfels, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 402 (1979).
12. The AMEX constitution provides:
If a member, member organization or approved person is required by
the Board, by the Chairman or by any committee authorized by the
Board or by the Constitution, to submit his or its books, papers and
records or the books, papers and records of any partner, director of officer of such member organization, or to furnish any information to, or
to appear and testify before, or to cause any of such employees, partners, directors or officers to appear and testify before, the Board, the
Chairman, any such committee, or such officers, employees or representatives of the Exchange as may be designated by the Chairman of such
committee, and such member, member organization or approved person
shall be adjudged guilty in a proceeding under this Article or having
refused or failed to comply with such requirement, such member or
member organization may be suspended or expelled from membership,
and such approved person may have his approval withdrawn.
AM. STOCK Ex. CONST. art. V § 4(k), [1978] 2 AM. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) 2161.
The Rules of Fair Practice of the NASD provide:
For the purpose of any investigation, or determination as to filing of a
complaint or any hearing of any complaint against any member of the
Corporation or any person associated with a member made or held in
accordance with the Code of Procedure, any Local Business Conduct
Committee, any District Business Conduct Committee, or the Board of
Governors, or any duly authorized member or members of any such
Committees or Borad of any duly authorized agent or agents of any such
Committee or Board shall have the right (1) to require any member of
the Corporation or person associated with a member to report orally or
in writing with regard to any matter involved in any such investigation
or hearing, and (2) to investigate the books, records and accounts of any

such member with relation to any matter involved in any such investigation or hearing. No member or person associated with a member shall
refuse to make any report as required in this Section, or refuse to permit
any inspection of books, records and accounts as may be validly called
for under this Section.
NASD RULES OF FAIR PRACTICE, art. IV, § 5, [1975] NASD MANUAL (CCH) 2205.
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Consequently, a member or affiliate under investigation
by the AMEX or the NASD is presented with two unattractive alternatives. He may refuse to testify and upon that
ground alone lose his membership or affiliation, or he may testify at the risk that his testimony may be used against him in
a subsequent criminal prosecution."' To compound the problem, the Commission has the authority to compel an investigation through a writ of mandamus, 14 in which case the investigation may be a little more than a device to coerce a
potential defendant into waiving his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.10 Finally, the penalty for refusal to testify is magnified by the authority of other SROs to
expel or suspend the recalcitrant party solely on the ground
that the party was expelled or suspended by the AMEX or
NASD Resolution of the Board of Governors further provides:
1. The President is hereby directed and authorized to notify members
of the Corporation who fail to provide information with respect to their
business practices and/or who fail to keep membership application and
supporting documents current and/or who fail to furnish such other information or reports or other material or data duly requested by the
Corporation pursuant to the powers duly vested in it by its Certificate of
Incorporation, By-Laws and such other duly authorized resolutions and
directives as are necessary in the conduct of the business of the Corporation, that the continued failure to furnish duly requested information,
reports, data or other material, constitutes grounds for suspension from
membership.
2. After (15) fifteen days notice in writing thereof, and continued
failure to furnish the information, reports, data or other material as described above in paragraph 1, the President is hereby directed and authorized to suspend the membership of any such member on behalf of
the Board of Governors, and to cause notification thereof in the next
following membership supplement, to the effect that the membership
has been suspended for failure to furnish such duly requested
information.
3. Prior to such notice, in writing to the member, the Executive
Committee of the Board of Governors shall be notified in writing of such
contemplated action by the President.
4. The President shall advise the member concerned, in writing, of
the supsension.
Id.
13. E.g., United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Sloan, 388 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
14. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u(e) (1980 Cum. Supp.).
15. See 8 CONN. L. REv. 725 (1976). The fifth amendment provides, in relevant
part: "No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself .... ." U.S. CONsT. amend. V, cl. 5. The scope of this comment is limited to
investigations affecting individual fifth amendment rights, as the protection against
self-incrimination is unavailable to corporations and other organizations. U.S. v.
White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944).
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the NASD."
In addressing this problem, this comment will first explore whether SRO disciplinary proceedings constitute state
action, thus triggering the fifth amendment protections. The
author will examine the criteria by which constitutional protections are imposed on ostensibly private conduct, and will
then apply the criteria to AMEX and NASD proceedings,
concluding that these proceedings should be deemed governmental for fifth amendment purposes.
The author will next consider whether the AMEX Constitution article V section 4(k) and article IV section 517 of the
NASD rules of Fair Practice constitute a coercion of self-disclosure in violation of the fifth amendment. This analysis will
include a discussion of economic coercion as violative of the
privilege against self-incrimination. Finally, the comment discusses the arguments concerning application of the privilege
to SRO disciplinary action and concludes that the AMEX and
the NASD provisions imposing sanctions on refusals to waive
the fifth amendment privilege are constitutionally defective.
II.

STATE ACTION AS APPLIED TO

AMEX

AND

NASD

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Because the fifth amendment is a restraint upon the state
and not upon private parties, its proscriptions would apply to
AMEX and NASD disciplinary proceedings only if state action is present. 18 To the extent the AMEX and the NASD exercise powers or functions of a governmental character they
should be subject to fifth amendment proscriptions.1 9
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(d)(3), 78o-3(h)(3) (1976).
17. See note 12 supra.
18. E.g., Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 83 (1932); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S.
323, 330 (1926); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 136 (1903); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1879); ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879); United States
v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555 (1875).
19. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) ("We
have, of course, found state action present in the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally reserved to the state."); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Terry
v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932). See also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715 (1961); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental
Soc'y, 355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966); Smith v. Holiday Inns of America, Inc., 336 F.2d
630 (6th Cir. 1964); Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
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A. Criteria for Determining When Private Conduct Constitutes State Action
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 20 the Supreme
Court set forth several factors, none of which is alone determinative, for the courts to consider in determining when federal
involvement is sufficient to subject ostensibly private conduct
to constitutional limitation imposed on the federal government. One factor is the degree of governmental regulation of
the nominally private conduct. The courts are more likely to
find state action in a closely regulated area.2 In assessing this
criterion, the courts consider whether the activity of the regulated entity is so closely connected with the state that the entity's action "may fairly be treated as that of the State
itself"."
Another relevant factor is the extent to which the private
entity is a monopoly."3 The monopolistic status of the private
enterprise is relevant if there is a significant relationship between that status and the challenged conduct."' If the existence of a monopoly makes the activity more threatening, a
court is more likely to find government action present.
A third criterion is the existence of a symbiotic relationship between the state and the private action.25 If the government and the private entity are so interdependent that they
are essentially joint participants in a single enterprise, a court
is likely to subject the ostensibly private conduct to constitutional restrictions upon the state.'
The governmental character of the nominally private action is another factor to be considered.27 State action is pre20. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
21. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1974); Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177-79 (1972); Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak,
343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952); DeMalherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, 438 F. Supp. 1121, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
22. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351.
23. Id. at 351-52; DeMalherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors,
438 F. Supp. 1121, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
24. 419 U.S. at 351-52.
25. Id. at 357-58; Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1972);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722-26 (1961); DeMalherbe v.

International Union of Elevator Constructors, 438 F. Supp. 1121, 1132 (N.D. Cal.
1977).
26. 419 U.S. at 357-58 (1974). See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715, 722-26 (1961), DeMalherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors,
438 F. Supp. 1121, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
27. 419 U.S. at 352-54 (1974); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1966);
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sent in "in the exercise by a private entity of powers tradi-

tionally, exclusively reserved to the State. '2 8 Thus, private
entities providing services essentially governmental in character may be subject to constitutional restraints. Using this test,
the Supreme Court had found state action in nominally pri-

vate conduct involving elections,

9

company towns,80 and mu-

nicipal parks."1

A final criterion to be assessed is whether the government
has sanctioned the challenged activity.2 Where such approval
exists in fact" or in appearance,3 the conduct of the private
entity will be closely examined.
The ultimate consideration is that of fairness. In Public
Utilities Commission v. Pollak, the Supreme Court held the
fifth amendment applicable to a private street railway company." The Court stated, "[W]hen authority derives in part
from Government's thumb on the scales, the exercise of that
power by private persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to its exercise by Government itself.""
Constitutional limitations apply to government conduct
and not private conduct in "the recognition that unchecked
governmental power threatens individual rights and liberties
in a manner qualitatively different from unchecked private
power." 's7 The same rationale supports the application of conTerry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506
(1946); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88-89 (1932); DeMalherbe v. International
Union of Elevator Constructors, 438 F. Supp. 1121, 1132 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
28. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
29. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
30. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
31. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
32. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 354-57 (1974); Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1972); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369,
380-81 (1967); Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952);
DeMalherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, 438 F. Supp. 1121, 1132
(N.D. Cal. 1977).
33. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 354-57 (1974); Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1972); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369,
380-81 (1967); Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952);
DeMalherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, 438 F. Supp. 1121, 1132
(N.D. Cal. 1977).
34. DeMalherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, 438 F.Supp.
1121, 1132 (N.D. Cal.1977).
35. 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952).
36. Id. at 462 n.8 (quoting American Communications Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S.
382, 401 (1950)).
37. DeMalherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, 438 F. Supp.
1121, 1131 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
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stitutional limitations to private or semi-private entities,
whose authority, deriving "in part from Government's thumb
on the scales,""8 poses a greater threat than is posed by purely
private enterprises.
B. State Action Criteria Applied to AMEX and NASD
Proceedings
1. Degree of government regulation.
Government regulation pervades AMEX and NASD operations. The Exchange Act is directly enforced by the SROs,
with the Commission in a supervisory capacity.3 9 The Commission must approve, 0 and may prescribe
or amend, 2
AMEX and NASD rules. AMEX and NASD must register
with the SEC,"' and the Commission has the power to deny,
suspend or revoke registration of an SRO." An exchange may
not delist a security without applying to the SEC.4 5 AMEX
and NASD members are closly regulated by the Commission,"' and their disciplinary actions are subject to SEC review. 47 Finally, the Commission may instigate an exchange investigation, 48 and subsequently obtain records of the
investigation for use in proceedings by the Commission.4 9
As a result of the Commission's extensive regulation of
the exchanges, the SROs are so closely connected with the
SEC that disciplinary action by the AMEX and the NASD
"may fairly be treated" as that of the Commission itself.'0
2. Monopolistic status and its relationship to the challenged activity.
The AMEX and the NASD occupy a substantially mo38. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 n.8 (1952) (quoting
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 401 (1950)).

39. Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); Silver v. New York
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Sloan v. New York Stock Exch., 489 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.
1973); S.REP. No. 94-75, supra note 1, at 24-38.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2) (1976).
41. Id. § 78s(b)(1).
42. Id. § 78s(c).
43. Id. §§ 78e, 78f, 78o.
44.
Id. §§ 78s(a)(1), 78s(h)(1).
45. Id. § 78.
46. Id. §§ 78g, 78h, 78i, 78k, 78q.
47. Id. § 78s(d).
48. Id. § 78u(a).
49. Id. § 78uib).
50. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
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nopolistic position." They possess a limited antitrust immu-

nity5" and as a result are permitted to participate in practices
which, in another industry, would constitute a refusal to deal
in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.58 For example,
under the Exchange Act a self-regulatory organization may require members to cease doing business, in whole or in part,
with a particular security." Further, an SRO may suspend or
expel a party who has been suspended or expelled from another SRO." This monopolistic status is substantially related
to AMEX and NASD disciplinary procedures in that, because
of- the SRO's peculiar status, and AMEX or NASD disciplinary sanction in effect reverberates thoughout the securities
industry."
3. Existence of a symbiotic relationship.
The AMEX and the NASD comprise a part of the enforcement machinery of the SEC. The general policy of the
Exchange Act is enforcement through self-regulation coupled
with oversight by the Commission.57 The exchanges form an
integral part of this self-regulation as both the principal markets for securities and the principal regulators of broker-dealers using those markets.' 8 This sytem of self-regulation is essential to achieve the goals of the Exchange Act: open and
orderly markets and fair dealing and fair pricing of securities
with economically efficient transaction costs.' The Commission's heavy involvement in AMEX and NASD matters, 60 cou51. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 347-49 (1963) (termination of direct-wire telephone connections by the New York Stock Exchange and its
members would be per se Sherman Act violation absent other statutory policy).
52. See, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694
(1975); Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975); Silver v. New York
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 520 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1975);
Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970); J.R. Williston
& Beane, Inc. v. Haack, 387 F. Supp. 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Zuckerman v. Yount, 362
F. Supp. 858 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Cowen v. New York Stock Exch., 256 F. Supp. 462
(N.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 371 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1966).
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-57 (1976); see Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341,
347 (1963).
54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(d)(1), 78o-3(h)(1), (2) (1976). An exchange may also limit
the number of its members, access to the floor of the exchange, and competition. Id.
§§ 78f(c)(4)(A), (B).
55. Id. §§ 78f(d)(3), 78o-3(h)(3).
56. See notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text supra.
57. See note 39 supra. See also S. REP. No. 94-75, supra note 1, at 22-33.
58. S. REP. No. 94-75, supra note 1, at 2.
59. Id. at 3. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (1976).
60. See notes 39-49 and accompanying text supra.
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pled with the SRO's participation in the enforcement of the
Exchange Act,"' makes the AMEX and the NASD, in effect,
subagencies of the SEC. Thus, the SROs and the Commission
are truly joint participants in the enforcement of the Exchange Act."
4. Governmental characterof the challenged activity.
The Exchange Act delegates to the AMEX and the
NASD governmental powers pursuant to its scheme of selfregulation." These powers include the ability to impose disciplinary sanctions on members and affiliates, to deny membership to an applicant, and to require members to terminate
business relations, entirely or in a specified way, with certain
nonmembers or with respect to a particular security."
This delegation of power permits the AMEX and the
NASD to enforce not only the legal requirements of the Exchange Act, but ethical standards as well." Because the police
power of the. AMEX and NASD extends beyond their members"0 and because the sanctions they impose are, in fact, industry-wide, 7 their disciplinary proceedings are essentially
61. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78o-3 (1976). In their role as self-regulators, the exchanges
and NASD are given broad discretion. E.g., Intercontinental Indus. v. American
Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1971). The courts are deferential to SRO interpretations of their own rules. E.g., Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 534 F.2d 156 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976); Fogel v. Chestnutt, 533 F.2d 731 (2d Cir.
1975); Carr v. New York Stock Exch., 414 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1976); cf. Moses v.
Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971). But see generally
Evans v. Kerbs, 411 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); 1975 amendments to Exchange
Act, Pub. L. No. 94-29, §§ 1-31(b).
62. S. REP. No. 94-75, supra note 1. "Industry regulation and government regulation are not alternatives, but complementary components of the self-regulatory process." Id. at 22. "The self-regulatory organizations exercise authority subject to SEC
oversight. They have no authority to regulate independently of the SEC's control."
Id. at 23.
63. S. REP. No. 94-75, supra note 1. See notes 6 & 7 supra.
64. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(d)(2),(3), 78o-3(h)(2),(3) (Supp. 1980). See note 7 supra.
65. S. REP. No. 94-75, supra note 1, at 23. See note 63 supra.
66. This is because the SROs may require their members to terminate business
relations with a nonmember or with respect to a security. S. REP. No. 94-75, supra
note 1, at 24. See note 7 supra.
67. This is because 1) they can require members to terminate business relations
with nonmembers and with respect to specified securities, and 2) persons suspended
or expelled by one SRO may be summarily suspended from any other SRO. See, e.g.,
art. V, § 5(a) of the AMEX Constitution:
Whenever a member or member orgapization is suspended or expelled
from any other securities exchange or any national securities association,
or is suspended or barred from being associated with any member of
such exchange or association, or is suspended or barred by any governmental securities agency from dealing in securities or being associated
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governmental in nature.6"
5. Government sanction of the challenged activity.
Commission sanction of AMEX and NASD disciplinary
procedures is apparent: the Exchange Act requires that the
Commission approve SRO rules and the Commission is empowered to amend those rules.6 9 Because of this imprimatur,
AMEX and NASD rules
regarding disciplinary action should
70
scrutinized.
closely
be
C.

The Congressional View
Congress has clearly recognized the quasi-governmental

character of the SROs: "[T]he exchanges...

are delegated

government power in order to enforce, at their own initiative,
compliance by members of the industry with both the legal
requirements laid down in the Exchange Act and ethical standards going beyond those requirements. ' 1 Legislative history
of the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act demonstrates
Congress' clear intent to impose due process requirements on
AMEX and NASD proceedings: "Recognizing that the selfregulatory organizations utilize governmental-type powers in
carrying on their responsibilities under the Exchange Act
highlights the fact that these organizations must be required
to conform their activities to fundamental standards of due
process."72
D.

The Judicial View

The Supreme Court has not expressly addressed the applicability of fifth amendment due process requirements to
SRO actions. In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,7 3 However, the Court held that the threshold question in determining exchange antitrust immunity was whether its procedures
were fair. Silver held the New York Stock Exchange had exwith any broker or dealer in securities, an Exchange Disciplinary Panel
may, in view of such suspension, expulsion or bar, suspend or expel such
person or organization as a member or member organization of the
Exchange.
68. See notes 27-31 and accompanying text supra.
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(b)(1),(2), 78s(c) (Supp. 1980).

70. See Intercontinental Indus. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935, 941 n.9
(5th Cir. 1971). See also notes 32-34 and accompanying text supra.
71. S. REP. No. 94-75, supra note 1, at 23.
72. Id. at 25.
73. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
74. Id. at 364-65.
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ceeded its statutory authority by withdrawing private wire

connections without opportunity for notice and hearing; thus
its action was not immune from antitrust liability. Because of
the NYSE's close relationship with the SEC, and its economic
importance, the exchange was required to provide procedures

comporting with due process if it wished to preserve antitrust
immunity.75 The Court noted the intensive regulation of the
exchanges by the SEC. 6
The lower courts have generally read Silver as determining that the exchanges' activities are so intertwined with those
of the state that they constitute state action for fifth amendment purposes. One court stated:
It is now beyond dispute that the Fifth Amendment due
process requirements as to federal action apply to the disciplinary hearings conducted by the Exchange. Such hearings are conducted under the self-regulatory power conferred upon it by a federal agency, the Securities &
Exchange Commission. In Silver... the court stated that
the Exchange Act of 1934 imposed upon the Exchange
the requirement that it comply with traditional notions of
'fair procedures ....

77

Similarly, in Intercontinental Industries, Inc. v. American

Stock Exchange,7 8 the Fifth Circuit noted that a need for flexibility did not justify the exchange rules' failure to provide the
necessary elements of constitutional due process. The court
determined that the AMEX's intimate involvement with the
SEC brought it within the purview of fifth amendment due
process, 7 9' but went on to find that the petitioner had received
75. Id. at 361-63.
76. Id. at 352-53 & n.7.
77. Villani v. New York Stock Exch., 348 F. Supp. 1185, 1188 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), aff'd sub noma.Sloan v. New York Stock Exch., 489 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1973). See
Intercontinental Indus., Inc. V. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1971):
[T]he Exchange's position that constitutional due process is not required since the Exchange is not a governmental agency is clearly contrary to numerous court decisions. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715... (1961), Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors,
Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); McQueen v. Druker, 438 F.2d
781 (1st Cir. 1971). The intimate involvement of the Exchange with the
Securities and Exchange Commission brings it within the purview of the
Fifth Amendment controls over governmental due process.
Id. at 941 (footnote omitted). The Intercontinentalcourt noted the pervasive government regulation of the exchanges. Id..
78. 452 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1971).
79. Id. at 941.
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a hearing comporting with due process requirements.
A departure from these determinations that SRO investigations constitute state action sufficient to require liance with
the fifth amendment, was the Second Circuit's decision in
United States v. Solomon.s0 The Solomon court held that an
NYSE interrogation was' not state action for purposes of the
fifth amendment self-incrimination clause. Solomon had been
requested to testify regarding his alleged understatement of
operating expenses."1 Under the NYSE constitution as it then
existed, Solomon could have been suspended or expelled for
refusal to testify. 2 The exchange forwarded Solomon's testimony to the SEC, which used it to subsequently indict and
convict him for "creating and maintaining false record."8
The Solomon court based its decision on the unfavorable
consequences of immunizing the subject of an exchange investigation from later criminal prosecution.8 4 The court apparently believed that a finding that the fifth amendment privilege applied to exchange disciplinary proceedings would
effectively give the NYSE the power to confer immunity.8"
This, however, is not an inescapable conslusion. The court
could simply have found the NYSE's suspension or expulsion
of members refusing to testify to be unconstitutional.86 Subsequent to the Solomon decision, the Exchange Act was
amended to require SROs to provide certain procedural protections; in addition, the amendments sharply increased SRO
involvement with the SEC.87 In light of this legislative development, the Solomon court's finding that state action is not
present in SRO investigatrions for purposes of the fifth
amendment privilege may no longer be good law.
Extensive federal involvement in AMEX and NASD proceedings is demonstrated by pervasive government regulation,
80. 509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975).
81. Id. at 865.
82. NEw YORK STOCK EXCH. CONST., art. XIV, § 9, [1972] 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH)
1659.
83. United States v. Solomon, [1975] FED. SEC. L. R"'. (CCH) 1 94,715
(S.D.N.Y. June 28, 1974).
84. 509 F.2d at 870.
85. Id. See also 8 CONN. L. REv. 725, 728-29 (1976) ("If testimony which had
been compelled by the Exchange were later excluded from a criminal proceeding
against the individual who testified, the Exchange, in effect, would be able to protect
its members from prosecution by compelling them to testify.").
86. See text accompanying notes 176-82 infra.
87. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). See note 173 infra.
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the SRO's limited antitrust immunity, the close interrelation
between the Commission and the SROs, the governmental
character of the disciplinary proceedings, and by Commission
sanction of these proceedings. 8 In light of this overwhelming
evidence of "Government's thumb on the scales," fairness
would dictate that AMEX and NASD proceedings be treated
as state action for constitutional purposes. s' Consequently,
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
should adhere to SRO investigations unless properly waived.
The ensuing section will discuss the coercive nature of AMEX
and NASD disciplinary actions as invalidating a purported
waiver of the fifth amendment privileges.
III. AMEX AND NASD DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS:
COMPULSORY SELF-DISCLOSURE VIOLATIVE OF THE FIFTH

AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE
The privilege against self-incrimination has been criticized on the ground that it shields guilty persons from justice

and is not needed by innocent persons.90 This criticism ignores the basic underpinning of the privilege that, regardless
of guilt, a person should not be forced to prove the government's case against him: in essence, to convict himself.9 1
88. See text accompanying knotes 18-38 supra.
89. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
90. Wigmoore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Prodere, 5 HARV. L. REV. 71 (1891).
As to its intrinsic merits ... may we not express the general opinion in

this way, that the privilege is not needed by the innocent, and that the
only question can be how far the guilty are entitled to it?

Id. at 86.
Terry, ConstitutionalProvisionsAgainst Forcing Self-incrimination,15 YALE L.
J. 127 (1906).
The rule of our law, which is embedded in our constitutions, that no one
shall be compelled to criminate himself, ought to be ablished, at least in
cjriminal cases. The reasons for it have ceased to exist, and it is now
merely a protection to rogues against justice.
Id. at 127.
See Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional
Change, 37 CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968); McCormick, Some Problems and Developments
Jin the Admissibility jof Confessions, 24 TEx. L. REV. 239, 277 (1946); Pound, Legal
Interrogationof Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. AM. INST. CraM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1014, 1015 (1934).
91. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944). "The immediate and potential
evils of compulsory self-disclosure transcend any difficulties that the exercise of the
privilege may impose on society in the detection and prosecution of crime." Id. at
698. See Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 162 (1955); Ullman v. United States,
350 U.S. 422, 426-27 (1955); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 91 (1908); E. GRiSWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 9-21 (1955). See also Boyd v. United States, 116
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The securities area illustrates why constitutional protections are necessary. There are indications that the public is
unsympathetic toward persons accused of violating the securities laws.92 Responding to a challenge that the SEC was violating fundamental rights, an SEC officials stated that such
practices were justified because, "[T]hese are the fat cats we
are dealing with.""3 It is incongruous to suggest that persons
accused of murder, robbery, or rape should be protected
under the fifth amendment, while a broker accused of an Exchange Act violation should be denied similar protection.
A.

Background

Provided state action is present, the privilege against selfincrimination may be raised in any proceeding: criminal, civil,
administrative, adjudicatory or judicial9 4 The proscription,
however, applies only to testimony tending to subject the
speaker to criminal liability.9 5 It cannot be raised to avoid
"the personal disgrace or opprobrium attaching to the exposure of . . . crime." ' SRO proceedings have not themselves
been found to be penal in nature, but have been held to exist
U.S. 616, 631-32 (1885).
92. See Freedman, A Civil LibertarianLooks at Securities Regulation, 35 OHIO
ST. L.J. 280 (1974); Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. LAW. 891 (1967);
Lowenfels, A Lack of Fair Procedures in the Aministrative Process: Disciplinary
Proceedings at the Stock Exchanges and the NASD, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 375 (1979).
93. Freedman, A Civil LibertarianLooks at Securities Regulation, 35 OHIo ST.
L.J. 280, 282 (1974), citing a letter from Professor Henry G. Manne in the Wall St. J.,
Aug. 10, 1973, at 6, col. 4.
See Freeman, Administrative Procedures 22 Bus. LAW. 891 (1967).
[There is some feeling on the part of the [SEC] investigator's staff that
they are dealing with unworthy persons. Sometimes there is a transference from the allegations or the feelings as to the character of the persons they are dealing with to the suggestion that such people are perhaps not entitled to the same rights as other citizens.
Id. at 892-93.
94. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965);
United States v. Zuskar, 237 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1956); Sas v. Maryland, 295 F. Supp.
389 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153 (4th Cir. 1971);
see In re Commonwealth Financial Corp., 288 F. Supp. 786 (E.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd 408
F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1969); United States v. Goldsmith, 272 F. Supp. 924 (E.D.N.Y.
1967).
95. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
96. Id. at 605. The Court added: "[Ijf the proposed testimony is material to the
issue on trial, the fact that the testimony may tend to degrade the witness in public
estimation does not exempt him from the duty of disclosure." Id. The proceedings
need not be criminal, but the information must expose the witness to a criminal
charge. Id. See also In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1977).
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for the protection of the public, rather than for the punishment of the offender.9 Although the actual proceedings are
not criminal cases within the language of the fifth amendment, the subject of an AMEX or NASD investigations may
also find himself facing criminal charges arising from his misconduct.98 Therefore the privilege, unless waived, should apply to SRO proceedings.
Determining when testimony has, in fact, been compelled
is the most troublesome area of the privilege. It is fundamental that the state may not coerce a waiver of the privilege."
Compulsion may take many forms, not the least important of
which, economic coercion, is particularly serious in the context of SRO proceedings.
B.

The Economic Coercion Cases

In Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Public Service
Commission,0 " the Supreme Court established that a state
must do more than merely claim voluntary waiver of a constitutional right. The Public Service Commission of Missouri
97. A.J. White & Co. v. SEC, 556 F.2d 619 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969
(1977). But see Kozerowitx v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 289 So. 2d 391 (Fla.
1974), where the Florida Supreme Court held a revocation or suspension hearing
before the Florida Real Estate Commission to be a criminal case.
98. E.g., United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975).
The witness' testimony may be used against him in an SEC action to withdraw
his broker's license or in a civil injunction action brought by the SEC. 15 U.S.C.
§§78f(d)(1), 780-3(h)(1) (1976) requires exchanges and registered securities associations to keep record in disciplinary proceedings, and 15 U.S.C. §21(b) (1976) gives the
Commission access to such records. The testimony may also be used in a criminal
action brought by the United States Attorney's Office. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
99. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).
[Clonvictions following the admission into evidence of confessions which
are involuntary, i.e. the product of coercion, either physical or psychological, cannot stand. This is so not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because the methods used to extract them offend
an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours
is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system-a system in which
the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out
of his own mouth.
Id. at 541.
While reliability of information is an evil which the proscription addresses, it is
not the privilege's raison d'etre. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07
(1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 228 (1940). See also Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54-55
(1949).
100. 248 U.S. 67 (1918).
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had charged the Union Pacific Railroad nearly $11,000 for a
certificate authorizing the company to issue bonds. The Union
Pacific paid the charges, but challenged the fee as an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce. The Missouri Supreme Court found that the railroad, by paying the
charges "volunatirly," could not challenge the payments on
constitutional grounds. 1 ' The United States Supreme Court
reversed finding that the company had not waived the right to
challenge the constitutionality of the fee. The. Court reasoned
that since conduct under duress always involves a choice however difficult, the government could always override constitutional provisions by providing intolerable alternatives for nonacquiescence, if acquiescence were found to effect a waiver. 102
The Supreme Court subsequently addressed economic coercion in the context of the fifth amendment privilege, in a
series of cases involving threatened loss of employment. Garrity v. New Jersey03 involved interrrogation of police officers
in the course of an investigation into the fixing of traffic tickets. The Court held that the threat of removal from public
office under a forfeiture of office statute rendered the statements involuntary and therefore inadmissable. "Where the
choice is 'between the rock and the whirlpool,' duress is inherent in deciding to 'waive' one or the other."104
Similarly, the Court in Spevack v. Klein 0 5 held that an
attorney cannot be disbarred for asserting his fifth amendment privilege. The Court found that the threat of disbarment was as coercive as the use of legal process.106 The Court
stated, "the 5th Amendment guarantees.., the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty... for
1' 07
such silence.

More recent Supreme Court opinions indicate that the
principle propounded in Garrity and Spevack is still valid.
101.

Id. at 69.

102. Id. at 70. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S.
280 (1912); United States v. Rothstein, 187 F. 268 (7th Cir. 1911).
103. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
104. Id. at 498. Accord, Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 243-44 (1966); Union
Pacific R.R. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67, 69-70 (1918).
105. 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (companion case to Garrity).
106. Id. at 516.
107. Id. at 514 (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)). The Court defined
"penalty" as any sanction making assertion of the privilege costly. Id. at 515 (citing
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965)).
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One year after Garrity and Spevack the Court held, in Gardner v. Broderick,'"° that a policeman could not be fired for
refusing to waive his privilege against self-incrimination. A variation on Garrity, which related to the use of the compelled
testimony, Gardner addressed the consequences of a refusal
to submit to the coercion. The Court indicated that a police
officer could be dismissed for refusing to answer questions
concerning his official duties if not required to surrender his
constitutional privilege.109
Uniformed Sanitation Men Association v. Commissioner
of Sanitation,1 a companion case to Gardner,held that New
York City sanitation employees could not be compelled to
choose between surrendering their privilege against self-incrimination or their jobs. The Court reiterated that the employees could be discharged for failure to account for their
conduct as public employees, but only if not required to relinquish their fifth amendment privilege."1 '
Similarly, Lefkowitz v. Turley112 held economic coercion
to be a sufficient compulsion to invalidate a purported waiver
of the privilege. The decision found the privilege applicable to
official inquiries into the job performance of government contract holders. The Court found no constitutional distinction
between the threat of loss of employment and the threat of
contract loss to a public contractor. It determined that disqualification from contracting with government agencies for a
period of five years was a sufficiently substantial economic
sanction to render a purported waiver secured under its threat
involuntary. 1 The Court held that the proscription could not
be overridden by state interest;' immunity must be granted
if testimony is to be compelled.115
108.

392 U.S. 273 (1968).

109. Id. at 277-78.
110. 392 U.S. 280 (1968).
111. Id. at 285. "[P]etitioners, being public employees, subject themselves to
dismissal if they refuse to account for their performance of their public trust, after
proper ,proceedings, which do not involve an attempt to coerce them to relinquish
their constitutional rights." Id.
112. 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
113. Id. at 83-84.
114. Id. at 78.

115. Id. at 84. It is important to remember that the information sought may be
compelled if use immunity is granted. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276 (1968);
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79-80 (1964); Ullman v. United States,
350 U.S. 422, 430-31 (1956); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). Thus, state inter-

est need not be wholly sacrificed for the protection of individual rights.
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In 1977, the Court decided Lefkowitz v. Cunningham,'1
the latest of the employment compulsion cases. In that case,
an attorney was divested of his state political party offices
pursuant to a New York statute when he refused to waive his
privilege in an appearance before a grand jury. The Court
held the statute violative of the attorney's fifth amendment
right to be free from compelled self-incrimination: "[O]ur
cases have established that a State may not impose substantial penalties because a witness elects to exercise his Fifth
Amendment right not to give incriminating testimony against
11

himself."

The positions that the attorney lost were unsalaried, 1 '
yet the Court found the sanction significant enough to constitute coercion.
It is true, as appellant points out, that our earlier cases
were concerned with penalties having a substantial economic impact. But the touchstone of the Fifth Amendment is compulsion, and direct economic sanctions and
imprisonment are not the only penalties capable of
forcing the self-incrimination which the Amendment
forbids 11
In finding compulsion, the Court noted the prestige and influence of Cunningham's party offices, the predictable damage to
his professional standing and general reputation, and his disqualification from potential compensated political and public
offices. 120
Certain guidelines emerge from the economic coercion
cases. First, in each case the test of involuntariness was the
existence of a substantial economic sanction. 2 ' In determin'
ing when a penalty has a "substantial economic impact,"122
the line should probably be drawn somewhere between Cunningham or Turley and United States ex rel. Sanney v.
Montanye, 2 in which the Second Circuit found that loss of a
job held by an itinerant laborer for two days was not a sub116. 431 U.S. 801 (1977).
117. Id. at 805.
118. Cunningham v. Bronx County Democratic Executive Comm., 420 F. Supp.
1004, 1007 (D.C.N.Y. 1976).
119. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 806.
120. Id. at 807.
121. Id. at 806.
122. Id. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1976); Gardner v.
Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276-78 (1968); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515-16 (1967).
123.. 500 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1974).
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stantial economic sanction rendering petitioner's statement
involuntary."2 4
Further, in each of the economic coercion cases the failure to testify, without more, was sufficient to trigger the sanction. 12 5 In contrast, the Supreme Court in Baxter v. Palmigiano,12 6 addressing the issue of procedural due process in the
context of prison disciplinary hearings, held that an adverse
inference may be drawn in a civil case from a refusal to testify
one of several factors to be considwhen such refusal was only
127
ered by the trier of fact.
Finally, the economic coercion cases reject the argument
that an overriding state interest may justify the constitutional
infringement. In each case important state interests were at
stake: the public interest in an honest police force 2 8 and civil
service,' 29 and in the integrity of state contracting practices "
and political process. " ' Under these cases, however, state interest need not be sacrificed. The state does not have to
choose between an accounting from, or a prosecution of, a
party-the availability of use immunity adequately protects
the public interest:' 3 ' "[U]se immunity . . . permit[s] the
state to prosecute appellee for any crime of which he may be
guilty.

. .

provided only that his own compelled testimony is

not used to convict him." 8 Consequently, the state does not
forfeit the opportunity to prosecute on the basis of independent evidence.
C. AMEX and NASD Proceedings and the Fifth Amendment: The Arguments
1. Loss of SRO membership constitutes a substantial
economic sanction.
124. Id. at 415.
125. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 804, 808 n.5(1977); Baxter v.
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 317-18 (1976).
126. 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
127. Id. at 317.
128. Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S.
493 (1967).
129. Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S.
280 (1968).
130. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
131. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977).
132. Id. at 808-09. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Lefkowitz v.
Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84-85 (1973).
133. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 809 (1977).
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The position of AMEX and NASD members and associates is similar to that of the aggrieved parties in the economic
coercion cases. Loss of membership is analogous to loss of employment because without access to the SROs, it would not be
feasible for a broker-dealer to remain in business. " 4 As the
Court in Turley recognized, an independent contractor is substantially affected when access to an important market is terminated.3 5 Broker-dealers are similarly affected when access
to the securities markets is terminated. 3
In both Turley and Cunningham the Court also considered indirect effects of the imposed sanction. In Cunningham
these effects included the politician's ineligibility for future
political or public office and loss of reputation and professional standing.13 7 The statute held unconstitutional in Turley

provided for both the cancellation of present government contracts and ineligibility for future government contracts as
sanctions for failure to testify.13 8 The Court also recognized
that the plaintiffs might encounter difficulty in obtaining future employment because no firm could hire them and remain
eligible for government contracts.13 9
The suspended AMEX or NASD member faces even
greater economic problems. The SROs dominate the securities
area, and while the architects in Turley might have survived
on work in the private sector, a broker-dealer could hardly remain in business without access to the securities markets.14 0
The SRO's monopolistic position renders loss of membership
far more disabling than mere loss of present employment because it also greatly restricts the availability of future employment. The AMEX and the NASD may bar the nondisclosing
party from employment, in any capacity, with any AMEX or
NASD member firm.14 1 Additionally, the expelled or sus-

pended party may find himself summarily susppended from
134. See. e.g., Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. LAW. 891 (1967).
135. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 83 (1973).
136. A broker-dealer suspended from one SRO may lose access to the facilities
of the other SROs. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(d), 78o-3(h) (1976).
137. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 807 (1977).
138. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 71 n.1 (1973).
139. Id. at 84 & n.4.
140. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Thill Sec. Corp.
v. New York Stock Exch., 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970); Robert Stark, Jr., Inc. v. New
York Stock Exch., 346 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
141. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(d), 78o-3(h) (1976). See S. REP. Np. 94-75, supra note 1,
at 24 note 7 supra.
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other SROs with whom he holds membership, on the basis of
his suspension from the AMEX or the NASD.' 42
2. Refusal to tesfity is the sole ground for imposing the
sanction.
As in the Garrity line of cases, the sanctions provided by
the AMEX and NASD rules may be imposed solely upon a
member's or associate's refusal to testify. Article V section
4(k) of the AMEX Constitution'4 " provides that, if a member
is required by an authorized party'44 to submit records, furnish information, or appear and testify, and he refuses or fails
to comply, he may be suspended or expelled from membership. An approved person who fails to comply with 14section
4(k) requirements may have his approval withdrawn.
Similarly, the NASD Rules of Fair Practice provide that
an authorized party146 may require a member or associate to
report orally or in writing with respect to any matter involved
in an investigation. 47 By resolution of the Board of Governors, the president of the NASD is authorized to suspend
142. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d)(3) provides:
A national securities exchange may summarily (A) suspend a member
or person associated with a member who has been and is expelled or
suspended from any self-regulatory organization or barred or suspended
from being associated with a member of any self-regulatory organization
...(C) limit or prohibit any person with respect to access to services
offered by the exchange if subparagraph (A) . . . is applicable to such
person ....
Similarly, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(h)(3) provides:
A registered securities association may summarily (A) suspend a member or person associated with a member who has been and is expelled or
suspended from any self-regulatory organization or barred or suspended
from being associated with a member of any self-regulatory organization
... or (C) limit or prohibit any person with respect to access to services
offered by the association if subparagraph (A) . . . is applicable to such
person ....
See note 7 supra.
143. See note 12 supra.
144. Authorized parties include the chairman of the Board of Governors, the
Board of Governors, or any committee authorized by the Board or the constitution.
AM. STOCK Ex. CONST. art. V, § 4(k), [1978] 2 AM. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) 2161.
145. Id.
146. Authorized party is defined as "any Local Business Conduct Committee,
any District Business Conduct Committee, or the Board of Governors, or any duly
authorized member or members of such Committees or Board .... " NASD RULES OF
2205.
FAIR PRACTICE, art. IV, § 5, [19751 NASD MANUAL (CCH)
147. The information may be required "[flor the purpose of any investigation,
or determination as to filing of a complaint or any hearing of any complaint against
any member.., or any person associated with a member made or held in accordance
Id.
with the Code of Procedure ....
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members who refuse to furnish the requested information. " "
Because a member's refusal to testify is the only ground necessary for suspension of membership, Baxter v. Palmigiano149
is inapplicable.
Baxter held it permissible to draw adverse inferences
from an inmate's silence at a prison disciplinary hearing.
Since the case involved prisoners who necessarily sacrifice, to
a certain extent, their constitutional rights upon incarceration,15 it is not necessarily applicable in the context of
AMEX and NASD proceedings. The case has, however, been
followed in cases involving proceedings to discipline attorneys"'1 and physicians,ls as well as other administrative and
civil proceedings. 15 The Supreme Court itself has given Baxter a broad reading but has emphasized the fact that failure
to testify was not determinative: "Respondent's silence in
Baxter was only one of a number of factors to be considered
by the finder of fact in assessing a penalty, and was given no
more probative value than the facts warranted . . . ."' Cases
applying Baxter emphasized that the Garrity-Lefkowitz decisions are restricted to situations where failure to waive the
privilege, "standing alone and without regard to other evidence,"15' triggers the sanction. SRO proceedings clearly fall
148. Resolution of the Board of Governors, [1975] NASD MANUAL (CCH) T
2205.
149. 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
150. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Christopher v. United
States Bd. of Parole, 589 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1978); Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d
100, 105 n.4 (1st Cir. 1978); Joint Committee on the Legal Status of Prisoners, The
Legal Status of Prisoners (A Tenative Draft), 14 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 377 (1977); Comment, Two Views of a Prisoner'sRight to Due Process:Meachum v. Fano, 12 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 405 (1977); Comment, The Supreme Court and The Constitutional Rights of Prisoners:A Reappraisal,4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219 (1977).
151. DeVita v. Sills, 422 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1970). The court stated: "There is
nothing in the rules or the court order from which we can conclude that the plaintiff's
failure to testify will be held a ground for disbarment or forfeiture of office." Id. at
1177. See Sternberg v. State Bar, 384 Mich. 588, 185 N.W.2d 395 (1971).
152. Arthurs v. Stern, 560 F.2d 477 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034
(1977).
153. See, e.g., United States v. Bain, 596 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1979); United States
v. White, 589 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1979); Ryan v. Montana, 580 F.2d 988 (9th Cir.
1978); United States v. Segal, 549 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1977); United States ex. rel.
Carbone v. Manson, 447 F. Supp. 611 (D. Conn. 1979); Shaw v. Riverdell Hospital,
150 N.J. Super. 585, 376 A.2d 228 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977); National Freight, Inc.
v. Ostroff, 133 N.J. Super. 554, 337 A.2d 647 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975).
154. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 808 n.5 (1977).
155. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976).
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within the Supreme Court's apparent requirement that the
sanction flow from the refusal to waive the privilege against
self-incrimination alone.' 1 6
3. Public interest cannot justify infringement upon the
privilege.
Because of the importance of the exchanges and the securities associations to the securities industry, and therefore
to the nation's economic health, a strong public interest sup157
Enports preserving the integrity of these organizations.
forcement of the securities laws may arguably be hampered by
requiring full constitutional protections in SRO proceedings."5 8 Clearly the enforcement system operates most efficiently and expeditiously with minimum constitutional
protections.
The difficulty with this argument is that it could be applied with equal force to criminal proceedings. Law enforcement in general would be more efficient if no privilege against
self-incrimination existed, but constitutional protections
should not be sacrificed to expediency.15 9 "The immediate and
potential evils of compulsory self-disclosure transcend any
difficulties that the exercise of the privilege may impose on
1 60
society in the detection and prosecution of crime."
In the economic coercion cases, the Supreme Court has
expressly rejected the argument that an overriding state inter-,
est may justify an infringment of the fifth amendment privilege.1 61 It would be difficult to argue that SRO proceedings
advance a higher state interest than that present in Garrity
and Gardner v. Broderick:16 2 the interest in an honest police
156. See notes 132-34 and accompanying text supra.
157. See S. REP. No. 94-75, supra note 1, at 3.
158. Poser, Reply to Lowenfels, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 402 (1979).
[T]he advantages of the self-regulatory system-expertise, speed, and
the enforcement of ethical as well as legal standards-are vital today as
they were in 1934. If SRO disciplinary proceedings were to become
merely a copy of those of the SEC, an important justification for having
a system of self-regulation would disappear.
Id. at 405.
159. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52 (1964); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951). See generally Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
160. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 490 (1951); United States v.
White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944).
161. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 808 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley,
414 U.S. 70, 78-79 (1973).
162. 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
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force.
A related argument, advanced in United States v. Solomon, is that to extend constitutional protection in SRO pro-

ceedings would render self-regulation in all areas unworkable."' Solomon, the only circuit court case to squarely
address the applicability of the privilege to SRO proceedings,

held no state action for purposes of the fifth amendment privilege was present. In so doing, the court minimized the extensive regulation in the securities area"" and found that the exchange was not an agency of the legislative government, on

the dubious ground that the government had not totally preempted self-regulation. " In light of the increased government
intervention in the securities area as a result of the Securities
Acts Amendment of 1975, the continued validity of this holding is questionable.1'6 In passing the new legislation, Congress
expressly recognized that the exchanges utilize governmental

power, 67 and required the exchanges, in disciplining members, to conform to procedural due process requirements that
the NASD was already subject to.' 6
The Solomon court emphasized the practical difficulties
of extending the protection of the privilege to the subjects of
SRO investigations. The court suggested that a decision in

favor of Solomon would give the exchanges the power to grant
immunity. The SEC, in response, would have to order the exchanges to either refrain from asking potentially incriminating

questions, or abandon "the only effective sanction possessed
163. 509 F.2d 863, 869-70 (1975).
164. Id. at 868-69.
165. The exchanges' "traditional process of self-regulation" was not displaced. . . .Rather the SEC was given the power and the duty to make
sure that the responsibility was diligently and effectively used . . . . It
is not enough to create an agency relationship that Solomon's conduct
violated both a rule of NYSE, thereby subjecting him to disciplinary
action by that body, and federal law, with consequent liability to civil
and criminal enforcement proceedings by the Government.
Id. at 869 (footnote omitted).
166. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, PuB. L. No. 94-29, 98 Stat. 97 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The amendments prescribe, minimum procedural requirements that exchanges must observe in their discliplinary proceedings, 15
U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1976), impose restrictions on the ability of exchanges to limit their
membership, Id. § 78f(c), and set fixed commission rates, Id. § 78f(e), increase Commission oversight over exchange rules, Id. §§ 78s(b), (c), and establish SEC review of
exchange disciplinary action, Id. §§ 78s(d)-(f). See note 87 and accompanying text
supra.
167. S. REP. No. 94-75, supra note 1, at 23-25. See note 7 supra.
168. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(h) (1976). See S. REP. No. 94-75, supra note 1, at 25.
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by a private body not endowed with the power to compel testimony.

' 169

This analysis fails to take into account a middle

course like that taken in Baxter v. Palmigiano7 0 which would
permit adverse inferences to be drawn from a failure to testify, but which171would not permit the failure to testify to be
determinative.

The court in Solomon overstated the importance to the
SROs of the suspension sanction for failure to testify. The
NYSE demonstrated that the rule is not essential to securities
industry self-regulation when it deleted its provision imposing
that sanction for failure to testify by amendment to its constitution in 1978.172 As noted previously,17 3 serious conflicts with
public policy can be minimized through the use of immunity:1 74 that device could ensure that both public interest and
7
individual rights are protected. 5

4. Consent to AMEX and NASD rules does not constitute a waiver of the privilege.
It has been contended that upon joining the AMEX or
the NASD a member agrees to be bound by its rules and constitution, and therefore has contractually consented to disciplinary proceedings delineated in the SRO's constitution and
rules. 176 While this theory justifies AMEX or NASD jurisdicition over a member, it does not support waiver of a constitutional privilege because of the unequal bargaining power of
the parties involved. Since an applicant's failure to consent
would result in denial of his membership application, any purported waiver of his fifth amendment privilege would be involuntary and therefore invalid under the economic coercion
169. United States v. Soloman, 509 F.2d 863, 870 (1975).
170.

425 U.S. 308 (1976).

171. See Arthur v. Stern, 560 F.2d 477 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034
(1977); DeVita v. Sills, 422 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1970); text accompanying notes 150-63
supra.
172. NEW YORK STOCK Ex. CONST. art. XIV, [1979] 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 1091.
Compare NEW YORK STOCK Ex. CONST. art. XIV § 9, [1957] NYSE GUIDE (CCH)

1659.
173. See text accompanying notes 135-40 supra.
174. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 809 (1977).
175. Id.
176. Poser, Reply to Lowenfels, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 402, 404 (1979); see Sloan
v. New York Stock Exch., 489 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1973); Robert Stark, Jr., Inc. v. New
York Stock Exch., 346 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co.,
287 F. Supp. 766 (D.C.N.Y. 1968). See also Lambon v. New York Stock Exch., 203
A.D. 302, 197 N.Y.S. 57 (App. Div. 1922); Stein v. Marks, 44 Misc. 140, 89 N.Y.S. 921
(Sup. Ct. 1904).
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cases.17

Court's addressing the consent issue in the context of
SRO proceedings have recognized constitutional limitations.
In Robert Stark, Jr., Inc. v. New York Stock Exchange,'7 8 a

federal district court held that, while exchange members subject themselves to exchange jurisdiction, the exchange must
exercise its power fairly. In Villani v. New York Stock Exchange,79 the court found that plaintiffs had knowingly and
intelligently consented to be bound by the exchange's constitution and rules, but added: "Were the ...

procedures more

suspect from a constitutional viewpoint, we might be inclined
to give less weight to this argument."' 80 The consent theory
also ignores legislative acceptance of the applicability of constitutional protections to SRO proceedings discussed above. 181
D.

AMEX and NASD DisciplinaryActions: The Future

The Supreme Court has not yet resolved whether fifth
amendment privilege waiver in the context of AMEX and
NASD disciplinary action is coercive and hence invalid. Because the costs of litigation and even temporary loss of SRO
membership is high, there is tremendous pressure on members
and associates to settle disputes at the SRO level.18 2 As a result there is relatively little litigation in the area. When the
issues do reach the courts, the courts have tended to require
only minimal constitutional protections. 88
177.

See text accompanying notes 107-40 supra. Cf. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v.

Public Serv. Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67 (1918) (no consent to waiver of constitutional right
when allegedly unconstitutional fee was paid so that company could issue bonds).
178. 346 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
179. 348 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
180. Id. at 1192.
181. See text accompanying notes 71-72 supra.
182. See Robert Stark, Jr., Inc. v. New York Stock Exch., 346 F. Supp. 217
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
183. Although courts have generally recognized that SRO investigations must
comport with due process, they have tended to consture constitutional requirements
narrowly. It has been held that the target of an SRO investigation has no right to
demand answers to interrogatories. Crimmins v. American Stock Exch., 368 F. Supp.
270 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 503 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1974). See also NLRB v. Interbor
Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 915 (1971); Villani v. New York Stock Exch., 348 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd sub nom.
Sloan v. New York Stock Exch., 489 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1973). One court found there was
no sixth amendment right to counsel in SRO disciplinary hearings. Crimmins v.
American Stock Exch., 368 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 503 F.2d 560 (2d Cir.
1974). NYSE, AMEX and NASD, however, have abolished their no-counsel rules. See
note 11 supra. Another case held that subjects of exchange disciplinary proceedings
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The reforms in the area of procedural protections have
tended to come from Congress 8' and the SROs themselves. 185
The NYSE has now deleted its rule providing for suspension
or expulsion from membership for refusal to testify. 186 The
AMEX and the NASD should follow the lead of the NYSE, or
alternatively amend their rules to denominate a member's refusal to testify as merely one factor to be considered in determining whether a disciplinary sanction is appropriate. 8 ' If the
AMEX and the NASD continue to fail to provide fair disciplinary procedures, the judiciary, Congress or the SEC should
require compliance with the fifth amendment proscription
against compelled self-disclosure.
IV. CONCLUSION
AMEX and NASD disciplinary proceedings should be
given state action treatment because, as a result of "Government's thumb on the scales," they pose a greater threat to individual liberties than does purely private conduct. Thus,
these organizations must afford protection to their members
from involuntary waiver of their fifth amendment privilege.
The present AMEX and NASD rules infringe upon members' fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
These constitutionally defective rules must be struck down, or
amended, if not by the organizations themselves then by the
Commission, the Congress, or the courts.
Sharon O'Grady

had no constitutional right to cross examine exchange officials or staff. Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1971).
184. Congress has mandated procedural due process requirements in SRO disciplinary actions. See notes 173-75 and accompanying text supra.
185. For example, all three major self-regulatory organizations have abolished
their no-counsel rule, despite court decisions holding no sixth amendment right to
counsel in SRO disciplinary hearings. See notes 11 and 93 and accompanying text
supra.
186. See note 179 and accompanying text supra.
187. See discussion of Baxter v. Palmigiano in text accompanying notes 150-63
supra.

